

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.141
7 June 1963
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THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 7 June 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC

(Czechoslovakia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO
Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. V. ISMIRLIEV
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. F. DOBIAS
Mr. Z. SEINER

Ethiopia:

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. R. d'ORLANDI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M. T. MBU
Mr. L. C. N. OBI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. N. ECÓBESCU
Mr. O. NEDA
Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Sweden:

Baron C. H. von PLATEN
Mr. G. ZETTERQVIST

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. V. A. SEMENOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN
Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S. E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J. G. TAHOUDIN
Mr. J. M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. C. C. STELLE
Mr. A. L. RICHARDS
Mr. D. E. MARK
Mr. R. A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): I declare open the one hundred and forty-first plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I was not present at the meeting on Friday last. However, I have now had an opportunity to study the verbatim record (ENDC/PV.139) of that meeting, and in particular the remarks of the Soviet representative on the subject of a non-aggression pact (ibid. pp.5 et seq.). In the course of his statement Mr. Tsarapkin referred a number of times to statements made by the Canadian delegation.

I wish to point out that Mr. Tsarapkin seems to have misinterpreted or misunderstood the Canadian position and the comments we put forward on 3 May (ENDC/PV.127, pp. 13 et seq. and 17 May (ENDC/PV.133, pp. 13 et seq.). I do not believe that it is necessary to weary the Committee by reiterating the various statements which I made and which seem to have been misinterpreted by Mr. Tsarapkin. The Canadian view is already on the records of the Conference, and the Soviet delegation can consult them further if it wishes to have an accurate understanding of our position.

I should like to add a few specific remarks about Mr. Tsarapkin's statement. On more than one occasion he attributed to the Canadian delegation arguments and points of view which in fact were put forward by the representatives of the socialist countries. I will give two examples.

Mr. Tsarapkin said on 31 May last (ENDC/PV.139, p.8) that I had argued that the Soviet draft non-aggression pact (ENDC/77) would be a regional undertaking or arrangement. Further on (ENDC/PV.139, p.13), he attributed to me the argument that the non-aggression pact is related to the normalization of the situation in Europe and connected to the question of European boundaries.

I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to what I said on 3 May (ENDC/PV.127, p.18). After quoting a number of statements made by the socialist representatives which connected this subject to security questions in Central Europe and the normalization and stabilization of the European situation, I said that those members of this Conference who proposed discussion of a non-aggression pact in this Committee themselves believed and strongly maintained that the matter was directly connected with general European political questions.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

That we drew the attention of the Committee to that fact surely cannot be interpreted as giving a judgment on whether the Soviet proposal or any of its features are good, bad or indifferent. On the contrary, what we said explained our view on the undesirability of discussing the Soviet proposal in this particular forum, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference. Nevertheless, Mr. Tsarapkin said many times that we had rejected the Soviet Union's draft non-aggression pact. How can he say that we reject that proposal when we have refrained from commenting on its substantive aspects? We have not rejected the Soviet draft proposal, and of course we have not accepted it. We have just given some of the reasons why it appeared to us that this was not the forum for it.

In his statement on 31 May Mr. Tsarapkin put forward a rather novel argument. He accused the Western representatives of trying to make this matter one for bargaining. He said:

"Haggling on questions of peace and war, on questions of international security, is a regrettable feature of the policy of the Western Powers, a feature which has been preventing progress in all fields of the Committee's work." (ENDC/PV.139, p.12)

If I understand that argument correctly, it seems inconsistent with the main theme of Mr. Tsarapkin's statement. Having accused the West of rejecting the Soviet draft non-aggression pact, he then seems to imply that we have not rejected it but wish to bargain about it. I hope that when Mr. Tsarapkin criticized the concept of bargaining he did not mean that the only course open to members of this Conference is to accept or reject Soviet proposals without attempting negotiation. After all, what is the difference between bargaining and negotiation? When two parties start from different standpoints or have differing objects, there has to be negotiation if an agreement is to be reached or, in other words, if a bargain is to be struck. On a number of occasions in this Conference the Soviet representative has treated Western comments, questions or suggestions about Soviet proposals as amounting to a rejection of them. He has done that in the field of general and complete disarmament when the West has been asking probing questions. He has done it in the field of collateral measures when the West has said that this is not the best place to discuss the particular measure of which I have been speaking.

Also at the meeting on 31 May, Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"... the representatives of the Western Powers in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, who shout from the rooftops that NATO is a purely defensive organization of the Western Powers and has no intention of attacking anyone, in reality prove the exact opposite by refusing to accept the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact." (ibid., pp. 5-6)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Those particular remarks of Mr. Tsarapkin reveal two characteristic points: first, the allegation that, by saying we do not think this is the forum in which to discuss a NATO-Warsaw Treaty non-aggression pact, we have rejected the substance of the Soviet proposal, and secondly that by so doing we prove that the West has aggressive intentions.

On the point whether this is the best forum for negotiating a non-aggression pact, I would point out to the Committee that such a pact would affect all members of both alliances. However, whereas there are five out of seven of the Warsaw Treaty members here, there are only four out of fifteen NATO members represented.

I do not think it would be useful to prolong argument on these points. We hope that the delegation of the Soviet Union will try to understand our viewpoint, and will refrain in future from imputing aggressive intentions where none exist. I am speaking now of matters other than the proposal (ENDC/77) that I have been talking about up to now. We hope also that the Soviet Union delegation will reconsider its approach to the work of the Conference, so that we may have a true negotiation and not a series of Soviet proposals which must be accepted by the West without explanation, modification or negotiation, failing which acceptance the Western members of the Conference are apt to be denounced as warmongers or, at best, as hypocrites.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): I should now like to speak in my capacity as representative of Czechoslovakia.

At our meeting last Friday, 31 May, I had the opportunity to express the views of the Czechoslovak delegation (ENDC/PV.139. p.25) with regard to the Soviet proposal (ENDC/91) to declare the Mediterranean area a zone free from nuclear missile weapons. In connexion with the unfounded arguments of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, who as usual have tried to get rid of this important proposal of the Soviet Union easily by dismissing it as one-sided and intended for propaganda, I have already pointed out that, despite these views and strivings of the Western countries, the idea of creating denuclearized zones is now well-established and alive; it is taking root ever more deeply throughout the world and meeting with ever greater response and support from the peoples and governments of various countries.

At today's meeting I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to certain aspects of the question of denuclearized zones, and critically analyse certain unfounded arguments of the Western Powers against a practical discussion and implementation of these proposals.

(The Chairman, Czechoslovakia)

The Czechoslovak delegation, which is anxious above all for the preparation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament, understands and highly appreciates proposals for collateral measures which could contribute, directly or indirectly, to the achievement of this basic aim. Together with the proposals not to proliferate nuclear weapons, not to station strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons on foreign territory, and to conclude a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries, the proposals for the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world are measures the implementation of which at the present time would substantially contribute towards the slowing down of the armaments race, to the lessening of tension, and thereby to the creation of favourable conditions for general and complete disarmament.

With this fundamental consideration in view, the Czechoslovak Government has always consistently given its support to proposals for the creation of zones free from nuclear weapons in various parts of the world, as and when such proposals were put forward.

The idea of creating denuclearized zones did not appear overnight. It was a result of the searchings, discussions and strivings of the peoples to find an effective way to restrict and then eliminate the danger arising from the presence and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It had its origin in the minds of the peoples who in the mid-1950s were anxiously watching the development of the plans of the military strategists of the United States and its allies in the direction of a further spreading of nuclear weapons in various parts of the world and in regard to equipping the armies of the NATO countries with nuclear weapons.

In this situation the proposal of the Government of the Polish People's Republic (ENDC/C.1/1) for the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe which would include, besides the Polish People's Republic, the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the two German States, acquired particular urgency. This proposal was submitted to the twelfth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1957 (A/PV.697, para. 136) and is also before us here.

In this connexion I should also like to remind representatives of the valuable initiative of the Government of the German Democratic Republic, which sent our Committee a memorandum circulated as document ENDC/16 of 27 March 1962. In that memorandum the Government of the German Democratic Republic expressed its support for the proposal of the Polish People's Republic for the creation of a denuclearized zone, and at the same time proposed that the aforesaid zone should be extended to the countries of Northern Europe.

(The Chairman, Czechoslovakia)

Adoption of the measures proposed in that plan for the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, which would prevent the stationing of nuclear weapons in an area so important from the political and military standpoint, would bring enormous relief to the peoples of Europe and the whole world. It cannot be doubted that such a step would have favourable effects on the general international situation: it would contribute towards lessening the danger of a nuclear war; it would strengthen the sense of security and contribute towards the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust in the relations between States and towards the creation of favourable conditions for the solution of other important problems on the agenda of our Committee.

This was and is the fundamental meaning of the Polish proposal, which embodied the opposition of the peoples to the accumulation of nuclear armaments and the threat of a nuclear war.

In the years since the proposal for the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe was made by the Government of the Polish People's Republic, the interest and anxiety shown by world public opinion in regard to putting an end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons have become even greater. This is evidenced by a number of proposals for the creation of similar zones in Scandinavia, the Balkans, the Near and Middle East, the Far East, the Pacific Ocean, Latin America and other areas. Furthermore, some important and practical steps have already been taken to put into practice the idea of denuclearized zones. I should like to recall the convention of December 1961, which recognized the need to respect the status of Antarctica as a denuclearized zone, and the important resolution of the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly proclaiming Africa a denuclearized zone (A/RES/1652(XVI)), which received new confirmation at the recent meeting of the Heads of States of Africa in Addis Ababa (see ENDC/93, para.1)

The idea of zones free from nuclear weapons has recently been given important support in the proposal of the Government of the Soviet Union to declare the Mediterranean area a zone free from nuclear missile weapons (ENDC/91, p.6). A nuclear-free zone in that area could become a continuation of the zone in Africa and create the prerequisites for its further extension to the Balkans, Central Europe and Scandinavia. Gradually a continuous belt of such zones could be created, thus supporting the valuable initiative of Mr. Uden (A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1,2), which in fact is a universal embodiment of the idea of denuclearized zones.

(The Chairman, Czechoslovakia)

All these proposals go to show beyond dispute how necessary and very urgent this question is. The statements made recently by a number of delegations in our Committee also testify to this fact. I should like to recall, for example, the statements of the representative of Ethiopia at our meeting of 20 February (ENDC/PV.100, p.21), those of Nigeria and India at our meeting of 6 May (ENDC/PV.128, pp. 18, 19, 24), and the statements of the representatives of the socialist countries during the discussion of a denuclearized zone in the Mediterranean (ENDC/PV.137).

In other forums where disarmament is being discussed the question of creating denuclearized zones has also received great attention. Permit me to recall, for example, the important assembly "World without Bombs", which took place from 21 to 28 June 1962 in Accra. The final resolution adopted by this Assembly on the question of denuclearized zones says:

(continued in English)

"The prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and the balanced creation of nuclear-free zones over a large area in the world is, under present conditions, of the utmost importance. This would be a concrete contribution towards the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and the achievement of an agreement on general disarmament. In particular we endorse the concept of a nuclear-free Africa and we welcome the initiative taken by the people of Africa. We propose the creation of nuclear-free zones in other areas, such as South-East Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, as well as the balanced creation of zones of disengagement in Europe." (Conclusions of the Accra Assembly, p.13).

(continued in Russian)

It is significant that the socialist and non-aligned countries are the active advocates of this idea and that the Western Powers, members of NATO, oppose it. Suffice it to remember the testy reaction with which the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom met at the meeting of 27 May (ENDC/PV.137, pp.22 and 26) the Soviet Union's proposal to declare the area of the Mediterranean Sea a denuclearized zone. A categorically negative attitude towards the idea of creating denuclearized zones is being taken particularly by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which, as is well known, opposes any proposals aimed at the lessening of tension in the world. Not surprising, therefore, are the malicious attacks which the Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. von Hassel, made on 2 June this year on the proposal of the President of Finland, Mr. Kekkonen, to declare Scandinavia a denuclearized zone.

(The Chairman, Czechoslovakia)

Permit me now to dwell on certain arguments put forward by the Western Powers for the purpose of minimizing the importance of denuclearized zones and preventing their implementation. Their representatives assert particularly -- as, for example, the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, did at our meeting of 27 May -- that such zones should not be set up -

"... in an area of direct military confrontation of the Great Powers or where there is ... a complex system of essential defensive arrangements such as exists in Europe." (ibid., p.22)

We, on the contrary, consider that denuclearized zones should be set up in all areas where there are the appropriate pre-conditions and, in particular, in the areas which are potential sources of conflict between the major Powers or where the circumstances are such that they may develop into such sources. We cannot go on merely marking time, fearing to take a step which might lead to practical intervention in the present military structure of certain areas and to the direct elimination of the sources of tension in certain parts of the world. If our Western partners representing the NATO countries here do not wish to recognize this, world public opinion is fully aware of it and is demanding with ever greater insistence that various areas of the world be declared denuclearized zones.

This has also found expression in our Committee. I should like to recall, for example the words of the representative of Ethiopia at our meeting of 20 February regarding the creation of a denuclearized zone in Africa:

"We should also be happy to see other countries of the world adopt it -- that is, the idea of nuclear-free zones --" for their own regions. We have no doubt that, if nuclear-free zones multiply and encroach especially upon sensitive areas, tension between the nuclear Powers will be significantly eased and a measure of relief and trust engendered. That would be a significant contribution to the arduous task of achieving general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.100, p.21)

At our meeting of 6 May the representative of Ethiopia, speaking of the valuable initiative of the Presidents of the five Latin-American countries, frankly expressed the hope that -

"... the example of this declaration will be followed by other governments, especially in certain sensitive areas where nuclear weapons already exist." (ENDC/PV.128, p.23)

Some of our Western partners continue to claim that the creation of nuclear-free zones given the present level of military technique, and particularly the existence of nuclear

(The Chairman, Czechoslovakia)

missiles, would not be expedient and could not achieve the aim we are pursuing. They also say, as did, for example, the representative of the United Kingdom, that -

"... Europe is a small continent geographically, and I have already intimated the problem of nuclear weapons in this context because of their almost global effect." (ibid., p.25)

They do not believe that -

"... Central Europe could isolate itself from the effects of nuclear war should it, unhappily, break out." (ibid.)

But what is the real situation? The proposal to create a nuclear-free zone in Europe, although it would still not eliminate the threat of a nuclear missile war, would nevertheless be a substantial contribution towards reducing the danger of such a conflict. First of all, wherever the armed forces of the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries are close to each other, it would prevent any possible local conflict, in which tactical nuclear weapons would be used, from developing like an avalanche into a world-wide nuclear war. The point is that these weapons would be eliminated from the armaments of the armies.

The possibility of a nuclear war by accident would also be to a considerable extent restricted. There would be eliminated the nuclear equipment of aeronautical means of delivery, which, in view of their technical peculiarities, represent a considerable risk of conflict by accident, whether as a result of a forced landing on the actual territory, or as a result of a violation of the air space of another State, which might occur by error or through a failure of instruments. The elimination from agreed areas of tactical and operational rocket delivery means which are distributed in various units of the armed forces would have a similar significance. This would prevent the possible misuse of nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of other countries. This is of particularly great importance in regard to the Federal Republic of Germany, in view of the adventurist nature of the military doctrine of German imperialism. The possible manufacture of nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic of Germany would also be precluded.

The Western Powers should weigh up carefully all these facts if they do not want to be drawn one day -- even against their will -- into a nuclear conflict brought about by the German militarists, with all the ensuing consequences.

The representative of the United Kingdom, in the statement already referred to in which he spoke against the creation of a denuclearized zone in Europe, admitted the possibility that even the countries of the area declared a denuclearized zone would become the victims of nuclear weapons in the event of a military conflict (ibid., p.26). In saying this he

(The Chairman, Czechoslovakia)

was losing sight of the fact that the very promulgation of such zones in peacetime would have an extremely positive importance for the strengthening of international security and might to a considerable extent prevent the outbreak of a nuclear conflict.

His assertion does not quite fit either the case where a nuclear conflict should actually occur, in view of the guarantees which the nuclear Powers would assume in regard to the countries of the zone in question: namely, not to use nuclear weapons against them. The Soviet Union has already repeatedly expressed its willingness to give such guarantees. Let the Western Powers assume the same obligation, and then the people of the countries included in the denuclearized zones could sigh with relief and shed their well-founded fears of the consequences of a thermonuclear war.

Also on 6 May, the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, also asserted that, in view of the global nature of nuclear weapons we should aim at:

"... denuclearizing the whole world within the framework of general and complete disarmament." (ibid., p.25)

He asserted this in order to minimize the importance of denuclearized zones. We also are among the convinced advocates of the principle that our main attention should be directed towards the preparation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. But that should not prevent us from striving actively and with all our energy to bring about the implementation of positive partial measures, including the creation of denuclearized zones.

However, Mr. Godber's position deserves attention for the reason that, on the one hand he tells us that when discussing collateral measures we should take the way of freeing the whole world from nuclear weapons and should give preference to this way before creating individual denuclearized zones; and on the other hand, as we saw during the meeting of our Committee held on 29 May, when discussing the question of general and complete disarmament he puts forward arguments which throw doubt on the possibility of nuclear disarmament at all (ENDC/PV.138, p.41). Where is the logic here? How can such a position be considered a serious approach to the negotiations?

Very often during the discussion of the question of denuclearized zones we hear repeated assertions about the proposal being one-sided. Thus, for example, at the meeting of 27 May the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, again criticized the Soviet Union's proposal to declare the Mediterranean a denuclearized zone, in particular for the alleged reason that while the United States would have to withdraw its submarines equipped with Polaris missiles from that area:

"Neither the Soviet Union nor any of its allies would perform a single act of arms reduction or withdrawal under this Soviet proposal." (ENDC/PV.137, p.26)

(The Chairman, Czechoslovakia)

But such an assertion is of course quite out of place. After all, it is not the Soviet Union but the United States and other NATO Powers who began unilaterally to deploy the deadly nuclear missile weapons in the area of the Mediterranean. Neither in the past nor at present have the socialist States subjected by such measures the countries of that area to the direct danger of their becoming, in the event of a military conflict, some of the first victims of a thermonuclear retaliatory strike against NATO's nuclear bases. If one-sidedness is to be seen in anything, it is precisely in these measures of the Western Powers and there alone.

Public opinion in Mediterranean countries is fully aware of this fact. This is shown by the reaction to the Soviet Union's proposal for the creation of a denuclearized zone in the Mediterranean, as well as to the statements of representatives of the Western Powers in our Committee. Permit me to read out at least a part of the leading article of "The Egyptian Gazette" of 29 May 1963:

(continued in English)

"Mr. Stelle's remark at Geneva on Monday was enlightening ... The point he seems to have missed -- although it would be more charitable to say he ignored it -- is that if the Mediterranean were a nuclear-free zone, if there were no Western targets for Soviet missiles in it -- Russia would be hardly likely to waste its nuclear ammunition on it."

(continued in Russian)

As for the attempts of the Western Powers to present the proposals of the Socialist countries for the creation of denuclearized zones as propaganda manoeuvres, I have already had the opportunity in my statements to point out their absolute groundlessness. I do not intend today to deal with such arguments again. Nevertheless, I should like to recall at least the words of the leading article of "Alger Republicain" of 24 May 1963, published in connexion with the United States reaction to the Soviet Union's proposal regarding a zone in the Mediterranean:

(continued in French)

"The only response the United States made was to speak of propaganda. In reality, this reaction hides its deep embarrassment, for the United States Government is aware that the attitude of the African countries to this Soviet initiative will be entirely favourable".

(The Chairman, Czechoslovakia)

(continued in Russian)

From all that has been said about the importance of zones free from nuclear weapons it follows that it is a question of measures which could substantially reduce the danger of the outbreak of a thermonuclear war. Their implementation would be an effective measure against the spreading of nuclear weapons to more States, and a reliable way towards the solution of the remaining problems on the agenda of our Committee--first and foremost, the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The arguments hitherto advanced by the Western representatives against the proposals for the creation of de-nuclearized zones do not stand up to criticism in the light of the facts and a realistic assessment of the situation.

The idea of creating such zones in different parts of the world is in fact nothing but the practical application of proposals for the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons to certain specific geographical areas. If the NATO countries are really in favour of adopting measures against the spread of nuclear weapons, as is stated, for instance, in the United States plan (ENDC/30), then it is difficult for us to understand their negative attitude towards the proposals of the socialist countries.

I should like to express the hope that the Committee will at last enter into a period of constructive discussions which will enable us to work out and recommend effective measures capable of leading to a real relaxation of international tension, to limiting and eliminating the threat of a nuclear war.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): I wish to begin this morning by making some observations on the proposal (ENDC/91, p.6) submitted by the Soviet representative at our meeting on 27 May (ENDC/PV.137, pp.9-14) to declare the Mediterranean area a nuclear-free zone. I do so because I think that the reaction of the Western delegations, and certainly that of the United Kingdom delegation, has not yet been fully understood by our Eastern European colleagues. I am bound to say that I am fortified in that belief after having listened to the speech of our Czechoslovak colleague this morning.

I said "the proposal submitted by the Soviet representative", but perhaps that is hardly an accurate description. The Committee will remember that what Mr. Tsarapkin did was to take a little over half an hour of the Committee's time to read out the complete text of a note addressed through normal diplomatic channels to the United Kingdom Government, and, I think, to some fifteen other governments which are mainly interested in a proposition of this kind, making the proposal for a nuclear-free Mediterranean area.

(Sir Paul Mason United Kingdom)

Our Soviet colleague did that almost before the envelopes containing the notes had been opened in the capitals of the countries concerned. He then enlarged very considerably on what he considers to be the merits of this proposal. But when the Western members of the Committee, and notably my own leader, Mr. Godber, expressed their first reactions to the proposal, our Soviet colleague upbraided us --- as I recall it, he notably upbraided our Italian colleague --- for speaking before our Governments had had time to consider the notes which they had received. In so doing, he was followed at our meeting on 31 May, by our Czechoslovak colleague. That, in fact, I suppose to be at the base of what our Czechoslovak colleague said this morning when he accused us of dealing lightly with this proposition (supra, p.6)

If the Soviet Government wishes to take the initiative in this matter in two forums at one and the same time -- via the diplomatic channel and in this Conference -- that is of course its own affair. But I suggest that it is hardly correct for it and its allies then to contend that, in that event, representatives of the Western Powers here cannot be allowed to react in this Committee until their Governments have considered the notes which they have received. In my submission, to claim that would be to give a clear advantage to the Soviet Government in presenting its case, which I am bound to say I can only characterize as being a propaganda advantage. I do so at the risk of offending our Czechoslovak colleague who, on 31 May and again today, seemed to me to display a little sensitiveness on this point.

As our Soviet colleague knows, and as indeed he has been told, his Government will of course in due process of time receive replies -- certainly a reply from the United Kingdom -- through the same channel by which the original communication was sent. But in the meantime it is only fair, and I think indeed only right, that we should respond in this Committee to what our Eastern European colleagues have said on the subject.

The position of the United Kingdom delegation on nuclear-free zones in general has been set out clearly and fully on various occasions, and in particular by the leader of my delegation at the meetings on 6 May (ENDC/PV.128, pp.24 et seq.) and 27 May (ENDC/PV.137, pp.22 et seq.) which have been referred to again this morning by the representative of Czechoslovakia. I shall take a moment of the Committee's time to recapitulate what that position is.

In our view any proposal for nuclear-free zones in a given area must have regard to certain criteria.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

First, such a proposal must have the support of the States directly concerned whose interests would be affected. The Czechoslovak representative said this morning that the proposal had already met -- as I took his words down -- with a large amount of response and approval (supra, p. 6). Well, we shall no doubt see in due course what the views are of the States who have been approached on this subject. Personally, before reaching conclusions I should prefer to await those replies.

Secondly, we contend that such a proposal cannot be applied to an area of direct military confrontation of the great Powers.

Thirdly, we say that it cannot be applied to regions where there is a complex system of essential defensive arrangements, such as those obtaining in Europe, which, pending general and complete disarmament, maintain the balance of power and thereby contribute to the preservation of peace.

The Czechoslovak representative challenged the second and third of those contentions this morning, and I hope to come back to that point in a moment. But, as far as the present Soviet proposal is concerned, we maintain that it clearly fails to meet the criteria which I have just enunciated. Those criteria can, we believe, be met in other areas. There is for instance the area of Latin America. Mr. Godber suggested on 6 May that such a proposal in that area is -

"... one which might well offer real advantages and might well be appropriate in the circumstances of Latin America." (ENDC/PV.128, p.25)

At the same meeting Mr. Godber stated:

"We adopt in relation to Africa exactly the same attitude I have indicated in relation to Latin America." (ibid.)

He went on to say:

"If the countries concerned really want this, then we shall adopt a very sympathetic interest towards it." (ibid.)

So I hope that our attitude on proposals for these areas is quite clear.

But, having said that, I think it is not necessary for me to remind the Committee that the complex system of defensive arrangements in Europe is very closely linked with the Mediterranean area, and that is where we begin to find the difficulties in the present Soviet proposal. Any attempt to upset those defensive arrangements, which, as I have said, maintain the present balance and thereby maintain peace in the area between East and West, could well lead to a dangerously unstable situation which might tempt a potential aggressor to believe that he could launch an attack on individual members of the North

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Atlantic Treaty Organization with impunity; or, in other words, he might be tempted to think that such an attack would not be resisted by the collective strength of the NATO Alliance as a whole. And that would be a grave miscalculation. We in the West do not believe in tempting possible aggression, and our defensive arrangements in the Mediterranean are designed to make sure that a potential aggressor does not miscalculate.

There is a further point on this proposal for a Mediterranean nuclear-free zone. Even if we were to accept such a proposal, our Eastern European colleagues have failed to show us how it could be effectively put into operation. I wish to take one simple point. It is very difficult to suppose that, if a nuclear war were to occur in Europe, the Mediterranean could hope to escape the effects of radioactive fallout even if it had previously been declared a nuclear-free area. I recall that the Soviet representative himself told us at our last meeting:

"As a result of the pernicious effects of atomic radiation, a nuclear war would cause untold calamities and the loss of millions of human lives also in countries that would not be directly subjected to nuclear bombardment." (ENDC/PV.140, p.19)

I only want to add to that very telling quotation the point that that particular consideration obviously does not alter our views, which I have again stated earlier in my remarks this morning, on one criteria which should govern the setting up of nuclear-free zones. In fact it reinforces them.

I am aware, of course, that the Czechoslovak representative this morning has stated that it is impossible to draw distinctions between nuclear-free zones, that the whole concept of nuclear-free zones is an admirable one, and that one should not try to distinguish between one in one area of the world and one in another. I really do not think that that is an argument I can follow in its literal sense. What I believe the Czechoslovak representative was really doing was to state that the way to bring about a general situation of the kind which he wishes to see is to bring about general and complete disarmament.

I was glad to notice that on that occasion he quoted (supra. p.12) with approval what the leader of my delegation has said on that subject; though I am bound to say that from our point of view he rather spoiled the effect by indicating that the United Kingdom delegation was hesitant about the practicability of reaching general and complete disarmament as a whole. I do not wish to get sidetracked into that kind of discussion except to point out that saying there are difficulties to be overcome is not the same as suggesting that the goal is either impossible or, still less, undesirable.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Having said all that, I should just like to make one positive suggestion. It is that it might very well be more useful if on this question of a Mediterranean nuclear-free zone we were now to await the answers which will be given to the Soviet Government's notes to the governments principally concerned, and that if the situation is to be studied further in this Committee, as it well may be, it should be in the light of our knowledge of those answers. I myself cannot believe that any other procedure could serve any very constructive purpose.

Having spoken on that subject, I want to turn to another topic, and that is the question of the Soviet draft declaration on bases, (ENDC/75). I wish to do so because I think I should make some reference to certain comments made on this subject, in reply to some comments of my own at a previous meeting (ENDC/PV.136, p.27), by the representative of Poland, Mr. Blusztajn (ENDC/PV.139, p.21). I realize, of course, that Mr. Blusztajn is not here, and I hope that both he and his successor in the Polish chair, Mr. Lachs, will forgive me if I take up the matter only at this moment.

I am bound to say that one of the many ways in which my mind was notably less nimble than that of Mr. Blusztajn was in my ability, or inability, to comment on a considered statement almost immediately and before I had time to read the record carefully. I do not wish to go into all the arguments which Mr. Blusztajn repeated at our meeting on 31 May, because those which he used a second time to my mind carried no more conviction than they had earlier; but he did take the trouble to think of a fresh series of arguments additional to those on which I had commented, perhaps a little adversely, on previous occasions, and I feel that I should try to make some comment upon them. Therefore I wish to deal with a series of quotations from what our Polish colleague said at that meeting.

The first argument with which I wish to deal is that in which Mr. Blusztajn informed us that "The Soviet draft declaration was not conceived as an abstraction..." (ibid.) That may well be so, but if it is, why is there no mention of the 700 medium-range ballistic missiles in Western Russia which would remain untouched by the Soviet proposal and which, as far as we in Western Europe are concerned, are very far from being an abstraction? Indeed, some of us have even gone so far as to point out that those missiles happen to exist and that they are targeted on Western European cities (ENDC/PV.136, p.28).

Then Mr. Blusztajn asserted that the Soviet proposal -

"... corresponds to a series of material conditions which have been accumulating throughout the post-war years." (ENDC/PV.139, p.21)

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

If I understand that remark correctly, then I ask again why there is no mention of the 700 Soviet missiles which certainly accumulated, if that is the right word, during that period. The word "accumulated" seems to me to be a very typical English understatement of the position.

Our Polish colleague then went on to assert that -

"... it is natural that the party which contributed to bringing this negative situation into being should make the greater efforts and the greater contributions to restore the status quo ante and to normalize the situation." (ibid., p. 22)

It is not quite clear to me what the status quo ante is in this connexion. Ante what? In any case, did our Polish colleague stop to consider which party has in fact contributed most to the negative state of affairs which constitutes the cold war? I do not propose to take up the time of the Committee to recapitulate developments in Europe after the Second World War, because it has been done so often. I shall simply say that if we in Western Europe considered ourselves in the past, and still consider ourselves now, threatened by the East, it would be helpful if our Eastern colleagues were from time to time to ask themselves why that is so.

I then go on to a further argument used by Mr. Blusztajn, when he said that -

"... the United States and its allies are responsible for the tension set up by the existence of bases on foreign territory..." (ibid.)

That is an argument which we often hear in this Committee, and it has been dealt with on many occasions faithfully and in detail. I shall only remind the Committee that the root of tension is to be found, not in the existence of bases set up by common agreement of all concerned, but in the threat to which those bases were originally, and still are, only a response.

In my next reference I shall not quote all the actual words used, but shall give the gist of what was said, and I hope it will be agreed that I have summarized it accurately. Our Polish colleague argued that it was just and fair that we in the West should "bear the greater onus of the costs" (ibid., p.22) involved in the Soviet proposal. As we have repeatedly shown -- I have shown it on at least two occasions myself -- this is not a question of the West bearing the greater onus. We should in fact have to bear the entire onus. Our Polish colleague said:

"This would represent a contribution to the cause of collective security, and ... would be tantamount to a tax on the undue wealth achieved in the course of the cold war." (ibid.)

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Proposals for the redistribution of income by taxation have always been a rather controversial issue. It is always disputable who has achieved undue wealth, or why that wealth has been unduly gained; and, of course, it is always very much easier to propose that the other man should pay the taxes.

But I do not want to detain the Committee on that argument. I do not think that we shall be misled by arguments like that one, or indeed like the others to which I have alluded. I leave it to the Committee to judge whether the general interest of the international community, of the new and higher international order to which Mr. Blusztajn referred, would be strengthened by a proposal which preserves the freedom of the Soviet Union to threaten the devastation of Western Europe and which at the same time undermines our right in Western Europe to counter such a threat by appropriate and effective defensive measures.

Baron von PLATEN (Sweden): As the Chairman will recall, in his statement made on 31 May as representative of Czechoslovakia he said inter alia that -

"... prominent Scandinavian Statesmen-- the President of Finland, Mr. Kekkonen, and the Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr. Erlander-- have repeatedly expressed themselves in favour of creating a nuclear-free zone that would include the countries of Northern Europe." (ENDC/PV.139, p.26)

In order to put the Swedish views on these matters into focus after the idea was launched by the President of Finland, I think I might usefully read out to this Committee the comments made by the Swedish Prime Minister on 29 May. Mr. Erlander said:

"Before expressing myself in more detail on the proposal made by President Kekkonen, I must have occasion to study more closely his interesting speech. I should like to stress, however, one point particularly mentioned by President Kekkonen, namely, that none of the Nordic States has atomic weapons on its territory, or is preparing to provide itself with such weapons.

"The Uden plan was an initiative taken by the Swedish Government with a view to breaking the deadlock on the disarmament question. We have preferred to regard the issue of denuclearized zones in connexion with a nuclear test ban treaty. We have been of the opinion that all the different proposals on disarmament should, in the first place, be dealt with in the United Nations Commission on Disarmament. The negotiations in Geneva on a test ban treaty are now at a decisive stage. We hope that the great Powers will bear in mind their responsibility to the world and overcome the still remaining obstacles to reach an agreement on a nuclear test ban."

(Baron von Platen, Sweden)

I hope that those words of the Swedish Prime Minister will clarify our views and also serve as an urgent reminder that we need and expect positive results in the long and difficult negotiations between the nuclear Powers on a test ban treaty.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): I now call upon Mr. Tsarapkin, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to avail myself of the right of reply. The representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, ended his statement today (supra, p.6) with an appeal to the Soviet Union to change its approach to the negotiations and not to insist on the acceptance of all the Soviet proposals in the form in which they have been submitted, without discussing them or without an opportunity to introduce modifications or amendments. That concluding sentence of Mr. Burns outwardly looks reasonable and, I would even say, encouraging. Of course, Mr. Burns, you are right: it is not a good thing when a participant in the negotiations refuses to consider the substance of amendments, modifications or additions to the proposals submitted by him.

But that thought of yours, which is outwardly quite reasonable, is not at all applicable to the situation which has come about in the Committee. In the first place, it should be pointed out that Mr. Burns depicts the substance of the matter incorrectly. He appeals to us to start negotiations and not to insist that the Soviet proposals be accepted as they are. He appealed to the Soviet Union not to refuse to consider amendments and modifications to the text of the Soviet proposals. Precisely that thought of Mr. Burns sounded encouraging in the sense that it could be taken as an indication that the Western Powers were themselves ready to start real negotiations on the Soviet proposals and had some amendments, additions and modifications to those proposals. Of course, Mr. Burns, we are ready to consider amendments and additions by the Western Powers to the Soviet proposals with the closest attention and in a most constructive manner.

But, as is well known, there are no amendments or additions by the Western Powers to the Soviet proposals before us, and you know it, Mr. Burns. The actual situation is far worse. You do not wish at all to discuss here the Soviet Union's proposals for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact (ENDC/77), and you have confirmed that today. Then what amendments or modifications to the Soviet proposals can we talk about? You also reject the Soviet draft declaration on the renunciation by States of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75) without even

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

attempting to submit any amendments or additions to it. The same can be said in regard to the proposals for denuclearized zones. Therefore Mr. Burns' concluding and encouraging sentence turns out, when verified, to be a hollow sound and not in accordance with the real position of the representatives of the Western Powers in the Committee.

Nevertheless, we should like to see in this sentence of the Canadian representative a hint that the representatives of the Western Powers intend to submit for the Committee's consideration their own amendments to the Soviet proposals in regard to a non-aggression pact, in regard to the text of the declaration, and in regard to denuclearized zones. If that is so, then we welcome it and assure Mr. Burns and his Western colleagues that we shall consider such amendments with all the attention they deserve -- provided, of course, that such amendments are submitted.

Now a few words by way of reply to the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason. Not only is it impossible for us to agree, but it is altogether difficult for us to understand the meaning of the United Kingdom representative's objections to the fact that the Soviet delegation informed the Committee (ENDC/PV.137, pp.9-14) of the contents of the Soviet Government's note regarding the creation of a denuclearized zone in the area of the Mediterranean Sea (ENDC/91). Sir Paul Mason's objections sound all the more strange since we submitted the text of this note to the Committee two or three days after its publication in the press. This Soviet proposal is undoubtedly of interest to the Committee, since we are discussing here the question of collateral measures and since the Committee already has before it proposals for the creation of denuclearized zones in other parts of the world.

Then what grounds has Sir Paul Mason for objecting to our reading out in the Committee the text of the Soviet note on the creation of a denuclearized zone in the Mediterranean and to our request to have it issued as a document of our Committee? We see no reason for reproaching us, or for any objection in this connexion on the part of the United Kingdom representative or anyone else.

As for the other considerations put forward by the representatives of Canada and the United Kingdom, we shall study them carefully and shall reply to them later.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): I do not wish to take the Committee's time in exercise of the right of reply, but I think I must simply correct our Soviet colleague on one point where I think he clearly did not understand what I said. I said (supra. p.15) that, if the Soviet Government wished to raise the question of the proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the Mediterranean in two forums at once -- by way of the diplomatic channel and simultaneously in this Committee -- that was certainly its affair and I made no

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

objection. But I added that in that event we must not be upbraided and reproached for replying in this Committee to questions raised here before the governments had given their replies to the communications made to them through the diplomatic channel. I am quite content to stand by that.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and forty-first plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Simovic, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Czechoslovakia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom, Sweden and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 10 June 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.5 p.m.

